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Abstract: This article introduces a general framework for fault ascription, which consists in
identifying, within a multi-component system, the components whose faulty behavior has caused
the failure of said system. Our framework uses configuration structures as a general semantical
model to handle truly concurrent executions, partial and distributed observations in a uniform
way. As a first contribution, and in contrast with most of the current literature on counterfactual
analysis which relies heavily on a set of toy examples, we first define a set of expected formal
properties for counterfactual builders, i.e. operators that build counterfactual executions. We then
show that causality analyses that satisfy our requirements meet a set of elementary soundness
and completeness properties. Finally we present a concrete causality analysis meeting all our
requirements, and we show that it behaves well under refinement. We present several examples
illustrating various phenomena such as causal over-determination or observational determinism,
and we discuss the relationship of our approach with Halpern and Pearl’s actual causality analysis.
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ties
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Analyse causale et attribution de fautes
dans les systèmes à composants
Résumé : Cet article introduit un cadre général pour l’attribution de fautes qui consiste à identifier,
dans un système à composants, les composants dont le comportement incorrect a causé le dysfonction-
nement du système. Nous définissons un ensemble de propriétés attendues de l’analyse contrefactuelle,
et nous présentons une analyse raffinée qui satisfait ces besoins. Ceci contraste avec la pratique courante
d’évaluer les définitions de causalité contrefactuelle a posteriori sur un ensemble d’exemples jouets. Nous
établissons la monotonie de notre analyse sous différentes notions de raffinement.
Mots-clés : causalité, analyse contrefactuelle, besoins formels, composants, hyperpropriétés



















Figure 1: An example system specification: components C1 and C2, system B
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Fault diagnosis and fault isolation [22, 35, 38] are important concerns for safety critical systems, as well
as for large digital systems such as telecommunications networks, cloud computing and social networking
platforms. In this paper, we are concerned with fault ascription which aims to identify, in presence of
evidence of a failure of a multi-component system, the components whose faulty behavior have caused
this failure. As defined, fault ascription can be seen as a precise form of fault diagnosis and fault isolation,
where the actual cause and origin of a system failure is sought, instead of simple explanations in the
form of possible behaviors conducive to the observed system failure.
Example 1. Consider the mutlicomponent system B described on the right hand side of Figure 1.
System B is formed by the product of two components C1 and C2 (synchronization product
⊗
a requiring
synchronization of components on event label a), whose correct specifications, Ĉ1 and Ĉ2 respectively,
are shown on the left hand side of Figure 1.
In system B, components C1 and C2 may exhibit faulty behaviors, manifested by g-labelled transitions
for C1, and f -labelled, h-labelled and e-labelled transitions for C2. State qf corresponds to a failure of sys-
tem B: B’s correct behavior is to repeatedly emit label c, driven by its internal clock C1. Assume now that
only events labelled a, c, f and e are visible and can be recorded in a log of B’s execution. An occurrence
of an e-labelled event signals the failure of B since it leads to the failure state qf . Consider the following
log L of a failed B execution: L =
{
∅, {a1}, {a1, c1}, {a1, c1, a2}, {a1, c1, a2, f}, {a1, c1, a2, f, e}
}
. In L are
recorded all the observable events of B’s execution. In log L, event ai corresponds to the ith occurrence
of a synchronization event on label a, event ci corresponds to the ith occurrence of a transition labelled
c, and events f and e correspond to the occurrences of transitions labelled f and e.
Fault ascription asks the questions: what is the cause, or origin, of B’s failure, manifested by the
occurrence of event e? and what components are at the origin of B’s failure? Explanations, i.e. executions










e→ (p1, qf )
where g
∗
→ denotes the possible occurrence of zero or more g-labelled transitions. However, these possible
explanations for B’s failure do not reveal the fact that possible faults in component C1, i.e. g-labelled
transitions, play no role in B’s failure. Indeed, reasoning counterfactually, it is easy to see that if C2
never fails, then B never fails: it takes an f -labelled or an h-labelled transition of C2 for B to fail,
and that fault occurrences in C1 have no incidence on the overall behavior of B (in particular, there are
executions of B in which C1 fails but B does not). The central question we consider in this paper is how
to formalize such counterfactual reasoning.
Remark 1. As should be clear from the above example, the notion of causality considered in this paper
is finer than the usual notion of causal dependency in event structures [37]. In particular, an event e in
the above example may causally depend on any number of events gi, but no gi would be a cause of e.
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1.2 Related Work
Diagnosis Fault diagnosis is an active research field, with diverse questions and techniques drawn from
different areas, including concurrency theory, discrete event systems, artificial intelligence, and control
theory. We consider in this section only what we believe to be the most relevant works in these areas.
The seminal work of [32] formalizes a theory of diagnosis for black-box components in first-order logic. A
diagnosis for an observed incorrect behavior is essentially defined as a minimal set of components whose
failure explains the observation. With respect to the techniques we use, our work is clearly related to
works on model-based diagnosis in discrete event systems [6, 38] and specifically diagnosis via unfolding
[17]. Our filtering operation is basically a reformulation of failure diagnosis [33] in the framework of
configuration structures we use. In contrast, the diagnosis questions in these works are actually very
different from ours. They include diagnosability questions, which amount to determining the possible
occurrence of (types of) hidden faults from the observation of executions, and explanation questions,
which amount to determining which (prefix of) executions are compatible with observations recorded
in a given log. Finding explanations is the key objective in the work by Haar et al. [5, 17]. In the
terms of our framework, their goal is to find efficient algorithms (using Petri net unfolding techniques)
for computing prefixes of the filtered log. They also extended their techniques to finding explanations in
systems with evolving topology [1], which we do not consider in this paper. To the best of our knowledge,
these works do not consider fault ascription as we do here.
Counterfactual analysis and actual causality Existing work on defining and analyzing causality
can roughly be divided into works based on counterfactual analysis, and works focusing on time series,
such as [16]. As pointed out in [31], counterfactual reasoning is strictly more powerful than mere as-
sociation, as done e.g. by analyzing time series. We will therefore focus on counterfactual analyses of
causality.
Counterfactual causality analyses are a much researched topic, see e.g. the pioneering work of [34,
28, 2]. Some of the most influential contributions have been proposed by Pearl, Halpern and coworkers
with their definitions of actual causality based on interventions on structural equations models (SEM) [2,
30, 20, 19]. We sketch a comparison between [19] and our work in Section 5.3. It has been pointed out
in [11] that Halpern and Pearl’s definitions of actual causality poorly support reasoning about state
changes. Their inability to distinguish between states and events, and between presence and absence
of an event, has been noted e.g. by Hopkins and Pearl [21]. In order for causality analysis to cope
with system dynamics and temporal dependencies, [21] outlines the use of situation calculus [29] as an
underlying model for counterfactual analysis. Counterfactuals are computed by enforcing or disabling
events. However, no formal definition of causality is provided.
A more recent line of work [25, 27, 3] extends Halpern and Pearl’s definition of actual causality with a
logic capturing orders of events in order to enable causality checking on execution traces. An application
of the approach is to construct probabilistic fault trees from a set of counterexample traces. Similarly,
[8] propose a definition of actual causality inspired by [20] for actions in a program. [4] adapts actual
causality to localize the causes for an execution trace to violate an LTL formula. Closer to our approach
are [12, 13] which target the more specific case of fault ascription for black-box components equipped
with specifications, with a log in the form of a vector of component traces. All events are considered
observable.
However, all of these approaches to causality analysis suffer from two limitations [11, 14]. First,
research on counterfactual causality analysis has been driven by a small set of simple examples, which
serve as benchmarks for pitting proposed definitions of causality against human intuition. We call this
approach Tegar, textbook example guided analysis refinement. We do not find Tegar, and its endless
stream of refinements introduced for dealing with specific examples, very appealing. We think a sound
approach for counterfactual causality analysis should first try to answer the question what formal require-
ments should this analysis meet?, before turning to the question how to implement it?. To the best of
our knowledge there is little existing work proposing principled ways of defining counterfactual causality.
[24] lists a set of requirements on definitions and analyses of causality that have been discussed in the
literature. [9] specifies formal constraints on the behavior of preemption and overdetermination in SEM.
In a similar spirit to our definition of counterfactuals, [26] defines the semantics of counterfactual analysis
for traces of events of stochastic rule-based models. [23] proposes a general categorical formalization of
interventions on a single variable.
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Second, causality analysis should compose with application constraints such as partial observability,
incremental analysis, and use of abstractions. The result of causality analysis is only meaningful if the
model on which the analysis is performed, and the implementation generating the observations, satisfy
a (refinement) relation required by the analysis. Theories of causation should be able to track causation
across these levels of abstraction, and must therefore have a well-defined behavior under abstraction and
refinement.
Our work opens an alternative approach to reasoning about causation. Rather than proposing defini-
tions of causality whose properties remain implicit and are discussed a posteriori, our goal in this paper
is to explicitly state a set of formal requirements before designing a counterfactual analysis satisfying
them.
1.3 Contributions
In this paper, we aim to develop a formal framework for counterfactual analyses of component-based
concurrent systems that avoids the pitfalls of the Tegar approach. Specifically, using a general notion
of component-based concurrent systems, we define formal requirements a counterfactual analysis of such
systems should satisfy. Our framework uses configuration structures [36] as a general semantical model
to handle truly concurrent executions, as well as partial and distributed observations, in a uniform way.
We then present a specific counterfactual analysis that satisfies these requirements, and as an early
study of the behaviour of this analysis under abstraction we establish its monotony under two notions
of refinement.
In more detail, we make the following contributions:
1. We formalize a set of general properties a counterfactual function should satisfy in order to enable
the construction of meaningful causality analyses. These requirements will serve as firm ground
for guiding the definition of concrete analyses and reasoning about their properties. This approach
contrasts with the usual way of defining counterfactual analyses whose behavior is validated a
posteriori on a set of toy examples [11].
2. Our formal requirements include well-behavedness under varying observability (better observability
improves precision of the analysis) and incrementality (adding new observations to a log improves
precision). The first requirement is crucial for causality analyses to work on abstractions. The
second requirement is essential to support incremental and on-the-fly analysis. We show that our
instantiated counterfactual function is well-behaved under several notions of refinement. To the
best of our knowledge, none of these properties, while being crucial for applying causality analysis
to non-trivial problems in computer science, has been studied before in the context of causation.
3. We state many of our results for hyper-properties, i.e. properties that accrue not just to sets
of executions, but to sets of sets of executions. Hyperproperties have been shown necessary to
deal with properties such as security and quality of service [7], and taking them into account in
our framework ensures our causality analysis can deal with violation of these kinds of properties as
well. We discuss the use of analyzing the causation (or violation) of hyper-properties on motivating
examples.
4. We propose a concrete well-formed counterfactual function and discuss our design choices on several
examples.
The above contributions considerably extend our preliminary work on this topic reported in [15].
Further improvements with respect to this earlier work include an improved reconstruction of the non-
observable behavior from a log, generalization to the causality analysis of arbitrary configurations that
are not necessarily violations of component specifications, an improved concrete counterfactual function,
and additional examples.
1.4 Outline
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces a set of notations and gathers
basic definitions and constructions on configuration structures and hyperproperties. Section 3 presents
our modeling framework, including our notions of systems, components, failures and logs. Section 4
RR n° 9279
6 Gössler & Stefani
introduces a set of general formal requirements a well-formed (or “usable”) counterfactual function should
satisfy, and discusses the properties of definitions of necessary and sufficient causality built on a well-
formed counterfactual function. The section ends with a discussion of the special case of causality analysis
for fault ascription. Section 5 proposes a concrete counterfactual function and discusses its properties
such as well-formedness and behavior under several notions of refinement. We informally discuss how
the proposed approach relates to Halpern and Pearl’s actual causality. A set of examples illustrates our
design choices of the counterfactual function. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Configurations structures and hyperproperties
We gather in this section notations, background definitions on configuration structures [36], and on
properties and hyperproperties [7].
2.1 Notations
We use N to denote the set of naturals, i.e. positive integers, and N∗ to denote N \ {0}, i.e. the set
of strictly positive integers. We use [n] to denote the finite set of naturals {1, . . . , n} if n > 0. If
n = 0, then [n] denotes the empty set ∅. We use boldface to denote tuples of elements taken from a





predicate P that applies to elements of a set S is identified with a subset of S. In the paper, we use
both set operations, e.g. s ∈ P, or predicate notation, e.g. P(s), where appropriate. We denote by 2S
the powerset of set S, i.e. the set of subsets of set S. We use min and max to denote the set of minimal
and maximal elements of a subset of an ordered set, respectively. Thus, when dealing with the powerset
2S ordered by set inclusion, we have, for A ⊆ 2S , minA = {x ∈ A | ∀a ∈ A, a ⊆ x =⇒ a = x}, and
maxA = {x ∈ A | ∀a ∈ A, x ⊆ a =⇒ a = x}.
2.2 Configuration structures
Definition 1 (Configuration structure). A configuration structure is a tuple (E, C), where E is a set (of
events), and C ⊆ 2E is a set of subsets of E, called configurations. A configuration structure (E, C) is
called rooted whenever ∅ ∈ C.
Definition 2 (Step transition relation). The step transition relation →C associated with a configuration
structure C = (E, C) is defined as follows:
• Synchronous interpretation: c→C d if c ⊆ d.
• Asynchronous interpretation: c→C d if c ⊆ d and ∀z ⊆ E, c ⊆ z ⊆ d =⇒ z ∈ C.
The atomic step transition relation 7→C associated with a configuration structure C = (E, C) is defined
as follows: c 7→C d if c→C d and ∀c′ ∈ C, c ⊆ c′ ⊆ d =⇒ c′ = c ∨ c′ = d.
Remark 2. When the configuration structure C is clear, we just write c→ d and c 7→ d for c→C d and
c 7→C d, respectively.
Remark 3. Most of the results of this paper do not depend on a particular interpretation. When they
do depend on the synchronous or the asynchronous interpretation of the step transition, this dependency
is explicitly stated.
We now define some operations and predicates on configuration structures.
Definition 3 (Operations and predicates on configuration structures). Operations and predicates on
configuration structures used in this paper are defined as follows:
• Composition: (E1, C1) ‖ (E2, C2) = (E, C) where E = E1 ∪ E2 and C = {c ∈ 2E | c ∩ Ei ∈ Ci, i = 1, 2}
• Intersection: (E1, C1) ∩ (E2, C2) = (E1 ∩ E2, C1 ∩ C2)
• Inclusion: (E1, C1) ⊆ (E2, C2) ⇐⇒ E1 ⊆ E2 ∧ C1 ⊆ C2
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• Maximal elements: max (E, C) = max C = {c ∈ C | ∀c′ ∈ C : c ⊆ c′ ⇒ c = c′}
• Projection: (E, C)↓F = (E ∩ F, C↓F) where C↓F = {c↓F | c ∈ C}, and c↓F = c ∩ F. For a set S of
configuration structures on the same set of events, we define S↓F = {C↓F | C ∈ S}.
• Expansion: let (E, C) be a configuration structure, and let F be a set such that E ⊆ F; we define
c↑F = {c′ ⊆ F | c′ ∩ E = c}, C↑F = {c↑F | c ∈ C}, and (E, C)↑F = (F, C↑F). For a set S of
configuration structures on the same set of events E, we define S↑F = {C↑F | C ∈ S}.
• Comparison: (E1, C1) ≤ (E2, C2) ⇐⇒ E1 = E2 ∧ ∀c2 ∈ C2 ∃c1 ∈ C1 : c1 ⊆ c2;
C1 > C2 ⇐⇒ ∀(c1, c2) ∈ C1 × C2 : c2 ( c1.
The above definitions of comparison will be used to define an exhaustiveness requirement in Section 4
and to state two results in Section 5, respectively.
Remark 4. When E ⊆ F, we have by definition: ∀d ∈ c↑F, d↓E = c.
2.3 Properties and hyperproperties of configuration structures
Definition 4 (Property and hyperproperty). A property P of configuration structures on events E is a
set of subsets of E, i.e. P ⊆ 2E. A hyperproperty P of configuration structures on events E is a set of
properties, i.e. P ⊆ 22E .
As an abuse of notation, when P is a property on events E, we also denote P the configuration struc-
ture (E,P). Likewise, given a hyperproperty P on events E, we can consider it as a set of configuration
structures {(E,P) | P ∈ P}.
Definition 5 (Satisfaction). Given a set of events E, a hyperproperty P (resp. property P) is said to be
satisfied by a configuration structure C = (E, C), noted C |= P (resp. C |= P), if C ∈ P (resp. C ⊆ P).
When adopting the asynchronous interpretation of the step transition relation induced by configura-
tion structures, these notions of satisfaction of properties and hyperproperties of configuration structures
coincide with the classical notions of trace-based properties and hyperproperties satisfaction, as defined
in [7]. More precisely, we have the following proposition.
Definition 6 (Trace set of a configuration structure). The set of traces, or trace set, Tr(C) of a set of
configurations is defined as the set Tr(C) = Trfin(C) ∪ Trinf (C), where
Trfin(C) = {σ ∈ [n]→ C | n ∈ N∗ ∧ ∀i ∈ [n− 1], σ(i) 7→ σ(i+ 1)}
Trinf (C) = {σ ∈ N∗ → C | ∀i ∈ N∗, σ(i) 7→ σ(i+ 1)}
The trace set Tr(C) of a configuration structure C = (E, C) is defined to be the trace set of its configuration
set, i.e. Tr(C) ∆= Tr(C).
Definition 7 (Configuration structure of a trace). A (finite or infinite) trace σ ∈ Tr(C) over C = (E, C)




where ran(σ) = {c ∈ C | ∃i : σ(i) = c}.
Proposition 1. For any configuration structure C = (E, C), hyperproperty P on E, and property P on
E, we have C ∈ P ⇐⇒ Tr(C) ∈ {Tr(P) | P ∈ P}, and Tr(C) ⊆ Tr(P) =⇒ C ⊆ P.
With the asynchronous interpretation of the step transition relation on configuration structures, for
any property P on E, C ⊆ P ⇐⇒ Tr(C) ⊆ Tr(P).
Proof. We note first that any element c of a configuration structure C = (E, C) occurs in some trace in
Tr(C): in the extreme case that a configuration c has no predecessor in the atomic step relation, then
the trace σ : [1]→ C such that σ(1) = c is indeed an element of Tr(C). The first part of the proposition
thus holds immediately for hyperproperties and properties.
For the second part of the proposition, assume C = (E, C) ⊆ P, where P is a property of configuration
structures. Let σ ∈ Tr(C). By definition, for some index set I, for all i ∈ I, σ(i) ∈ C, and thus σ(i) ∈ P.
Assume for the sake of contradiction that for some i ∈ I we have ¬(σ(i) 7→P σ(i + 1)). It would mean
there exists z ∈ P such that σ(i) ⊂ z ⊂ σ(i+1). However, since σ(i)→C σ(i+1), with the asynchronous
interpretation we have z ∈ C, which contradicts the fact that σ(i) 7→C σ(i + 1). Hence, for all i ∈ I,
σ(i) 7→P σ(i+ 1) and thus σ ∈ Tr(P). The converse is clear, from the initial remark.
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The second part of Proposition 1 fails with the synchronous interpretation of the step transition.
Consider the configuration structure C with configurations C = {∅, {a}, {a, b, c}}, and the property
P = {∅, {a}, {a, b}, {a, b, c}}. We have C ⊂ P, but Tr(C) contains the trace σ ∆= ∅ 7→C {a} 7→C {a, b, c},
which is not present in Tr(P) for we do not have {a} 7→P {a, b, c}.
Remark 5. A property P gives rise to an associated hyperproperty [P], defined as [P] ∆= 2P , and called
its lift hyperproperty. Satisfying a property P is equivalent to satisfying its lift hyperproperty [P].
The notions of safety properties and liveness properties extend to hyperproperties [7]. Of particular
interest to us in this paper are safety hyperproperties, i.e. hyperproperties whose violations can be
detected with finite observations and cannot be rectified by future events. We recall the definition of
safety hyperproperty below.
Definition 8 (Witness). A witness is a finite configuration structure.
Definition 9 (Safety Hyperproperty). A hyperproperty P is a safety hyperproperty if for any configu-
ration structure C that violates P, i.e. such that C 6|= P, there exists a witness M ⊆ C such that for any
configuration structure C ′ with M ⊆ C ′, we have C ′ 6|= P.
Remark 6. Any safety hyperproperty P is subset-closed, i.e. for any configuration structures C and
C ′, if C |= P and C ′ ⊆ C, then C ′ |= P. By construction, the lift [P] of property P is a subset-closed
hyperproperty (though not necessarily a safety hyperproperty).
Because they are a source of useful examples, of particular interest to us in this paper will be k-safety
hyperproperties.
Definition 10 (k-safety hyperproperty). A k-safety hyperproperty is a safety hyperproperty such that
every violating configuration structure has a witness with at most k traces in its trace set.
Remark 7. The 1-safety hyperproperties are the lifted safety properties, i.e. P is a 1-safety hyperproperty
iff P = [P], where P is a safety property.
3 Components, systems, failures and logs
In this section, we introduce our modeling framework, which relies on notions of component and system
specifications, as well as notions of failures and logs.
3.1 Components and systems
A component specification is intended to capture the expected correct behavior of a component. A system
specification is intended to capture the actual behavior of a system composed of a set of interacting
components:
Definition 11 (Component and System specification). A component specification is a rooted configu-
ration structure. A system specification is a pair (S, B), where:
• S = (Si)i∈I is a finite tuple of component specifications Si = (Ei, Ci).
• B = (B,B) is a rooted configuration structure, where B =
⋃
i∈I Ei, called a system behaviour
specification or behaviour specification for brevity.
We use the word “component” in a broad sense to denote part of a system behavior. The configuration
structure B, as its name implies, is a specification of the system behaviour: it is used to express assump-
tions and constraints on the possible (correct and incorrect) behaviors of the composition of components
that constitute the system. In particular, B can be used to model synchronization and coordination be-
tween components. The component specifications define the correct behavior of components, in the sense
of normality of [18]. The actual component behavior in a system may violate those specifications: for







part of the behaviors of S may not be feasible according to B.
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Example 2. An example system specification is illustrated in Figure 1. In this example, component
specifications are given by the configuration structures (E1, C1) and (E2, C2) associated with automata Ĉ1
and Ĉ2, respectively:
E1 = {ai | i ∈ N∗} ∪ {gi | i ∈ N∗}
C1 = {∅} ∪ {{ai | i ∈ [n]} | n ∈ N∗}
E2 = {ai | i ∈ N∗} ∪ {ci | i ∈ N∗} ∪ {f, h, e}
C2 = {∅} ∪
{




{ai | i ∈ [n+ 1]} ∪ {ci | i ∈ [n]} | n ∈ N∗
}
In the above specifications, events ai, gi and ci denote the ith occurrence of an a-labelled transition, of a
g-labelled transition, and of a c-labelled transition, respectively. Events e, f and h denote the occurrence
of an e-labelled, of an f -labelled, and of an h-labelled transition, respectively.
The system specification is given by the configuration structure (E,B) associated with the product with
synchronization on action a (noted ⊗a in Figure 1) of the two C1 and C2 automata (Ĉ1 and Ĉ2 automata
extended with g-labelled, and f -labelled and h-labelled transitions, respectively):
E = {ai | i ∈ N∗} ∪ {gi | i ∈ N∗} ∪ {ci | i ∈ N} ∪ {f, h, e} (1)
B =
{























































{ai | i ∈ [n+ 1]} ∪ {ci | i ∈ [n]} ∪ {gj | j ∈ [m]} ∪ {f, e} | n,m ∈ N∗
}
(13)
Each line in the above definition of B corresponds intuitively to a series of executions of system B.
Lines (2) and (3) correspond to executions with no faults from C1 or C2. Lines (4) and (5) correspond
to executions featuring only faults from C1 (occurrences of g-labelled transitions). Lines (6) and (7) cor-
respond to executions featuring a faulty transition h from C2. Lines (8) and (9) correspond to executions
featuring a faulty transition f from C2. Lines (10) and (11) correspond to executions featuring faults
from C1 and a faulty transition h from C2. Lines (12) and (13) correspond to executions featuring faults
from C1 and a faulty transition f from C2.
Figure 2 shows a subset of the configuration structure (E,B).
Our naming of events in the specification above is adequate for the asynchronous interpretation of the
step transition relation. Dealing with the synchronous interpretation would have required a more complex
naming scheme for events arising from terminal f -labelled, h-labelled and e-labelled transitions of the C2
component, or the use of the event naming scheme in [10]. For the sake of simplicity, we have preferred
to opt for the ad-hoc naming scheme above, and we will use only the asynchronous interpretation of the
step transition relation for this running example throughout the paper.
A few comments on our model choices are in order.
Remark 8. An alternate definition for a system specification that explicitly accounts for events E∗ not
appearing in component specifications could be defined as follows:
System specification – alternate definition. A system specification is a pair (S, B), where:
• S = (Si)i∈I is a finite tuple of component specifications Si = (Ei, Ci)
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∅ {a1} {a1, c1} {a1, c1, a2} . . .
{h} {a1, f} {a1, c1, h} {a1, c1, a2, f} {a1, c1, a2, f, e}
{g1} {a1, g1} {a1, c1, g1} {a1, c1, a2, g1} . . .
{g1, h} {a1, f, g1} {a1, c1, g1, h} {a1, c1, a2, f, g1} {a1, c1, a2, f, g1, e}
. . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 2: Subset of the configuration structure (E,B) of Example 2. Edges represent the atomic step
transition relation.
• B = (B,B) is a rooted configuration structure where B = E ∪ E∗, E =
⋃
i∈I Ei and E
∗ ∩ E = ∅.
However, one can always transform a system specification (S, B) according to the above definition into
a system specification A(S, B) complying with Definition 11: let S = 〈S1, . . . , Sn〉, it suffices to define
A(S, B) = (S′, B), where S′ = 〈S1, . . . , Sn,>E∗〉 and >E∗ = (E∗, 2E
∗
).
Remark 9. Our definition of system specification places no constraint on the the relationship between the
system behavioral model and the component specifications. This affords us a lot of freedom in formalizing
system specifications and notably in specifying component composition and system failures. However, as
will become apparent in Section 4, the intent is that events in a system specification reflect events from
components executions, and that a system specification has some correlation with the composition of
component specifications. Accordingly, a meaningful system specification (S, B) should satisfy B ∩ ‖i∈[n]
Si 6= ∅, i.e. B should allow for some correct behavior of its components. The configuration structures
in our running example 2 illustrate this: we have C1 ‖ C2 ⊆ B, although this is a simple situation
where the system specification can be described as a product of modified composition specifications. Our
implicit assumption on the relationship between system and component specifications relies on the simple
form of configuration structure composition we have adopted, where possible synchronizations between
components take the form of common events in their event sets. At the expense of additional complexity,
one could have opted for instance for a composition based on a parallel composition of configuration
structures based on the categorical product, restriction and relabelling as in [37]. This would have led to
more complex conditions in Section 4, e.g. for characterizing consistent specifications for fault ascription,
or in the definition of necessary and sufficient causes. We believe our present setting to be both simple
and general enough to accommodate many forms of component composition and failure models, even if it
is at the expense of some ingenuity in the naming of events (as illustrated in our running example with
f and h events).
3.2 Faults, failures, and logs
Given a system specification (S, B) with events in E, a fault is an incorrect behavior with respect to S.
A failure with respect to a (hyper)property P over E is a violation of the latter. In the general case, P
may be violated even though all components satisfy their component specifications. In Section 4.3 we
will consider the special case where satisfaction of all component specifications implies satisfaction of P.
Conversely, the violation of a component specification does not necessarily entail a violation of P. This
is useful e.g. to model systems that tolerate certain component faults.
Remark 10. As remarked above, a meaningful specification of a system should satisfy ‖i∈[n] Si ∩B 6= ∅,
but the analysis described below does not depend on this assumption.
We start with a notion of consistency that generalizes the classical notion of absence of (binary)
conflict in event structures [37].
Definition 12 (Consistency ©). Given sets C and B of configurations, C is consistent with respect to
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∅ {a1} {a1, c1} {a1, c1, a2}
{a1, c1, a2, f} {a1, c1, a2, f, e}
{g1} {a1, g1} {a1, c1, g1} {a1, c1, a2, g1}
{a1, c1, a2, f, g1} {a1, c1, a2, f, g1, e}
. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 3: Subset of the filtered log LB of the running example.
Observations of the execution of a system take the form of logs and log systems.
Definition 13 (Log and log system). A log L of a system specified by (S, B) with B = (B,B), relative
to a set of observable events O, is a rooted configuration structure (O,L) that is consistent with respect
to B, i.e. such that O ⊆ B, (O,L) ⊆ B↓O, and ©BL.
A log system is a set of logs.
The use of consistency will become clear with the definition of filtering and the examples below.
Intuitively, when B is a behaviour specification and C is a log, then consistency of C with respect to B
means that the set of all observed events in the log C can be extended to some configuration in B. In
other terms, if C is consistent with respect to B, then events in C are not mutually in conflict and can
appear in some configuration of B.
Definition 14 (Detected failure). A violation of a hyperproperty P is detected by a log system L =
{(O,Li) | i ∈ I} whenever
⋃
i∈I Li 6|= P↓O.
As is standard practice in fault diagnosis [6], we now introduce a notion of filtering, that retrieves
possible explanations for the observed behaviour recorded in a log.
Definition 15 (Filtering ). Let L = (O,L) and B = (B,B) be two configuration structures such that
O ⊆ B. We define the filter of B by L, noted LB, as follows:
LB =
{
c ∈ L↑B ∩ B | ©B(L ∪ {c})
}
The filtering operation extracts configurations from B that are consistent with observations provided
by the log L.
Example 3. For B = (B,B) with B = {τ, a, b}, B =
{
∅, {τ}, {a}, {a, b}
}





we have LB =
{
∅, {a}, {a, b}
}
. The configuration {τ} is consistent with the observed
configuration ∅ ∈ L but inconsistent with the observation {a} (since {τ, a} 6∈ B). Hence we do not have
{τ} in LB. The configurations {b} and {τ, b} are also consistent with the observed configuration ∅ ∈ L
but they are not present in B, hence we do not have them in LB.
Example 4 (Filtering on the running example). Applied to Example 2, where L = (O,L), with O =
{ai, ci | i ∈ N} ∪ {f, e}, L =
{
∅, {a1}, {a1, c1}, {a1, c1, a2}, {a1, c1, a2, f}, {a1, c1, a2, f, e}
}
, the configura-
tion structure L  B is shown in Figure 3. The consistency constraint of Definition 15 eliminates, in
particular, all configurations of B that contain event h, since they are not consistent with the observed
event f .
Remark 11. To simplify notations in the following sections, given a system specification and its be-
havioral model (B,B), we often write sets of configurations X ⊆ B using logical formulas with events
as propositional variables indicating the occurrence of these events. For instance, X = f stands for
X = {c ∈ B | f ∈ c}.
We gather below the definitions of auxiliary functions and predicates which will be useful in the
definition of our causality analysis framework.
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Definition 16 (Predecessor closure: pc, lpc). A set of configurations C is predecessor-closed with respect
to C′, written pcC′(C), if for any c ∈ C, c ∈ min C′ or max {c′ ∈ C′ | c′ ( c} ∩ C 6= ∅. We write lpcC′(C)
to designate the largest predecessor-closed subset of C with respect to C′.
Hence, pcC′(C) ⇐⇒ C = lpcC′(C). Intuitively, C is predecessor-closed with respect to C′ if each
element of C has some immediate predecessor with respect to ⊆ in C′ that is in C. Note that, by definition
of the atomic step transition relation, if c ∈ C′ we have max {c′ ∈ C′ | c′ ( c} = {c′ ∈ C | c′ 7→C′ c}.
Example 5. For C =
{




∅, {a}, {a, b}, {c}, {d}, {c, d}
}
we have lpcC′(C) ={
∅, {d}, {c, d}
}
.
Definition 17 (Prefix inclusion v). C ′ = (E′, C′) refines C = (E, C) by prefix inclusion, noted C ′ v C,
if C ′ ⊆ C and pcC(C′).
Definition 18 (Immediate predecessors pre). preC(S) =
⋃
c∈S max {c′ ∈ C \ S | c′ ⊆ c}
The immediate predecessors of a configuration structure S thus correspond to the set of configurations
not in S that can evolve directly into a configuration of S. This informal explanation is backed up by
the following proposition:
Proposition 2. preC(S) =
⋃
c∈S{c′ ∈ C \ S | c′ 7→C c}
Proof. Given configuration structures C, S, and c ∈ C, define Z(c) = max {c′ ∈ C \ S | c′ ⊆ c} and
Y (c) = {c′ ∈ C \ S | c′ 7→C c}. We show that for all c ∈ S, and c′ ∈ Z(c), there exists d ∈ S such that
c′ ∈ Y (d). Let c′ ∈ Z(c). If c′ 7→C c, then c′ ∈ Y (c) and we are done. If c′ 67→C c, then there must be
some d ∈ C such that c′ 7→C d ⊆ c and d 6= c. Now, we cannot have d ∈ C \ S for c′ ∈ Z(c), hence d ∈ S
and c ∈ Y (d). This establishes that preC(S) ⊆
⋃
c∈S Y (c). The converse is clear since for any c
′ ∈ Y (c)
we have c′ 7→ c, and thus, by definition of the step transition relation, c′ ∈ Z(c).





Ci =⇒ C′↓Ei ⊆ Ci
)
define invariance of S = ((Ei, Ci))i∈I between C and C′. Given a log L = (O,L),
inv+S (L, C′) ⇐⇒ ∃C ⊆ B : C↓O = L ∧ invS(C, C′) defines possible invariance of S between L and C′.
Intuitively, a set of component specifications is invariant between two configuration structures C and
C′ if the fact that all the components behave correctly in C is also true in C′. A set of component
specifications S is possibly invariant between a log L and a configuration structure C′, if L is a projection
of a configuration C such that S is invariant between C and C′.
4 Counterfactual Configurations Analysis
In this section we define a notion of causality analysis of component behaviors for the violation of a
system-level property. Our notion of causality analysis is dependent on a notion of counterfactual builder
for constructing counterfactuals, which we require to obey certain key properties. A counterfactual is
a configuration set that does not contain configurations from a given exclusion set, corresponding to
possible executions of a system that avoid the configurations in the exclusion set.
A causality analysis takes as inputs the following elements:
• A system specification σ = (S, B), with component specifications S = ((Ei, Ci))i∈I and a behaviour
specification B = (B,B), with B =
⋃
i∈I Ei.
• A set O ⊆ B of observable events.
• A property P ⊆ 2B or hyperproperty P ⊆ 22B .
• A log L = (O,L) or log system L = {(Oj ,Lj) | j ∈ J}.
• A set X ⊆ B of non empty configurations, called an exclusion set.
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The exclusion set X is a candidate configuration set to be checked for causality with respect to
violation of P, i.e. causality analysis checks whether X is a cause for the violation of P.
As discussed above, the set of faulty configurations (L  B) \ ‖iCi is, in general, incomparable with
the violation of P: the latter does not need to occur simultaneously with the violation of component
specifications. Similarly, as illustrated in Example 1, the mere fact that the violation of P is preceded
by the violation of a component specification Sk, is not sufficient to establish that the latter is a logical
cause of the former. We now turn to the formal definition of a causality analysis, and its attendant
notion of causality.
In order to verify whether the configurations in X are a cause for the violation of P in L, a causality
analysis constructs the (hypothetical) system behavior where the configurations in X and their effects on
the observed execution do not occur, under the contingency that the parts of the log that are not impacted
by X remain consistent with the actual observations. It then verifies whether all obtained behaviors
satisfy P.
Remark 12. The property P may encompass both safety and liveness requirements. There are two
reasons in favor of not restricting the analysis to safety. First, the “log” may represent an infinite
counterexample trace, constructed for instance by a model-checker, that violates a liveness property, and
we want to find out why. Second, even for finite logs, the counterfactuals may be infinite, such that
liveness can be a concern.
The main element of a causality analysis in our framework is an operation for building counterfactuals.
Formally, a counterfactual builder is an operation on configuration sets, CFσ,X ,O : 22
E → 22E , that, given
the configuration set of a log L = (O,L), in the context of a system specification σ, an exclusion set X ,
and a set of observable events O, builds a set of configurations CFσ,X ,O(L) that is “counterfactual with
respect to X in σ, consistent with log L”. Intuitively, the set of configurations CFσ,X ,O(L) models the
system behavior “if X had not happened”. We omit the subscripts σ and O in CFσ,X ,O when there is no
risk of ambiguity. The action of counterfactual builder CFσ,X ,O is extended to log systems as follows:






Remark 13. The above definition of counterfactual with respect to a set of logs may give the impression
that spurious behaviors are introduced in the log system counterfactual when taking the union of log
counterfactuals. Consider the following log configuration sets: L1 = {∅, {a}} and L2 = {∅, {b}, {b, a}}.
We have a.b ∈ Tr(L1 ∪ L2) but a.b 6∈ (Tr(L1) ∪ Tr(L2)), so are we not introducing the unobserved
behavior a.b in the counterfactual? In fact since {a} is a configuration that occurs in an execution of
the system (L1), then configurations {a} and {b} are concurrent and the trace a.b is thus a valid trace
in the configuration set of the system. The example just illustrates the fact that logs record only partial
information on the execution of a system: here log L2 does not record the occurrence of ‘a’ prior to that
of ‘b’, despite the fact that events ‘a’ and ‘b’ are concurrent.
4.1 Requirements on Counterfactual Builders
We define in this section a set of formal properties we require of a counterfactual builder. We then define
the notion of a well-formed counterfactual builder as a counterfactual builder meeting several of our
requirements. A well-formed counterfactual builder is used as a basis for our notion of causality analysis
in the following section. We begin by defining three requirements which provide lower and upper bounds
for the set of counterfactuals computed by a counterfactual builder, given a log, a behaviour specification,
and an exclusion set.
The first requirement is that counterfactual builders be sound, namely that they do produce coun-
terfactuals, i.e. possible executions of a system that do not encounter the given exclusion set. This is
the most basic requirement one can impose on counterfactual builders: an execution can be deemed
counterfactual with respect to an exclusion set X only if it does not contain any of the configurations in
the exclusion set. Formally:
Requirement 1 (Soundness Snd). A counterfactual builder CFσ,X ,O is sound if it satisfies the property
Snd below, for any log L = (O,L), system specification σ = (S, B), B = (B,B), and exclusion set X :
Snd ∆= CFσ,X ,O(L) ⊆ B \ X
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∅ {a1} {a1, c1} {a1, c1, a2}
{a1, c1, a2, f} {a1, c1, a2, f, e}
{g1} {a1, g1} {a1, c1, g1} {a1, c1, a2, g1}
{a1, c1, a2, f, g1} {a1, c1, a2, f, g1, e}
. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Figure 4: On the filtered log of the running example, the configurations containing event f (printed in
red) are removed by counterfactual builders satisfying Snd, for the exclusion set X = f∨h. Independence
correctness Ci requires the configurations highlighted in bright green to be included in counterfactuals
built by the counterfactual builder. Dependence correctness Cd requires that the configurations added
by the counterfactual builder be bounded from above by the supersets of the configurations {a1, c1, a2},
{a1, c1, a2, g1}, {a1, c1, a2, g1, g2}, etc, which are highlighted in darker green.
The second requirement is that counterfactual builders be independence correct, namely that they
keep, in the counterfactuals they construct, configurations in the filtered log that are independent (in
the sense of true concurrency) from the configurations in the filtered log that touch the exclusion set.
Again, this requirement seems intuitively clear: if we have a configuration c in the filtered log L  B
that does not contain a configuration c′ that touches the exclusion set X (i.e. such that c′ ∈ X ), then it
must be part of a counterfactual execution. Formally:
Requirement 2 (Independence correctness Ci). A counterfactual builder CFσ,X ,O is independence
correct if it satisfies the property Ci below, for any log L = (O,L), system specification σ = (S, B),
B = (B,B), and exclusion set X :
Ci ∆= {c ∈ LB | ∀c′ ∈ (LB) ∩ X : ¬(c′ ⊆ c)} ⊆ CFσ,X ,O(L)
The third requirement is that counterfactual builders be dependence correct, namely that they build
counterfactuals from the immediate predecessors of the exclusion set in the log in order to preserve as
much of the logged execution as possible. In other terms, dependence correctness ensures that configu-
rations not in the filtered log L  B can be added in a counterfactual only if they are greater than the
last correct observation preceding some configuration in the exclusion set. Formally:
Requirement 3 (Dependence correctness Cd). A counterfactual builder CFσ,X ,O is dependence correct
if it satisfies the property Cd below, for any log L = (O,L), system specification σ = (S, B), B = (B,B),
and exclusion set X :
Cd ∆= CFσ,X ,O(L) \ (LB) ⊆ {c ∈ B | ∃c′ ∈ preLB(X ) : c
′ ⊆ c}
Example 6 (Snd, Ci, and Cd on the running example). The definitions of requirements Snd, Ci, and
Cd are illustrated in Figure 4 for the exclusion set X = f ∨h. Independence correctness provides a lower
bound for the set of computed counterfactuals, while soundness and dependence correctness provide upper
bounds for the set of computed counterfactuals.
The first three requirements above apply to any behaviour specification, irrespective of its relation
with component specifications. The next requirement, called correctness invariance, insists that a coun-
terfactual builder preserve in counterfactuals the correctness of components that had a correct behavior
during the logged execution. One can see correctness invariance as a consistency requirement for fault
ascription. Formally:
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Requirement 4 (Correctness invariance Cinv). A counterfactual builder CFσ,X ,O is correctness in-
variant if it satisfies the property Cinv below, for any log L = (O,L), behaviour specification σ =
((Ei, Ci)i∈I , B), B = (B,B), and exclusion set X :
Cinv ∆= ∀i ∈ I,
(
(LB)↓Ei ⊆ Ci =⇒ CFσ,X ,O(L)↓Ei ⊆ Ci
)
The last two requirements below are of a different nature from the previous ones: they are concerned
with the behavior of causality analysis under variations in what is observed through a log. Requirement
Obs asks for anti-monotony with respect to variation in the set of observable events: more observable
events entail less uncertainty and thus smaller counterfactuals. Formally:
Requirement 5 (Observation anti-monotony). A counterfactual builder CFσ,X ,O is observation anti-
monotonic if it satisfies the property Obs below, for any log L = (O,L), behaviour specification σ =
((Ei, Ci)i∈I , B), B = (B,B), and exclusion set X :
Obs ∆=
(
X ⊆ LB ∧ pcB↓O(L) ∧ ∀O
′ ⊆ O,X ↑B↓O′ = X
)
=⇒ CFσ,X ,O(L) ⊆ CFσ,X ,O′(L↓O′)
Requirement Inc asks for incrementality of the analysis: a log with more observations leads to a
more precise diagnostic. Formally:
Requirement 6 (Incrementality Inc). A counterfactual builder CFσ,X ,O is incremental if it satisfies the
property Inc below, for any log L = (O,L), behaviour specification σ = ((Ei, Ci)i∈I , B), B = (B,B), and
exclusion set X :
Inc ∆= ∀ log L′, L v L′ ∧ LB ⊆ L′ B ∧ invS(LB,L′ B) =⇒
CFσ,X ,O(L′) \ (L′ B) ⊆ CFσ,X ,O(L) \ (LB)
Definition 20 (Well-formed counterfactual builders). A counterfactual builder CFσ,X ,O — where σ =
(S, B) is a system specification with B = (B,B) and X ⊆ B is an exclusion set with ∅ /∈ X — is
well-formed if for any log L = (O,L) it satisfies the property Wf below
Wf ∆= Snd ∧Ci ∧Cd ∧Cinv ∧Obs ∧ Inc
Proposition 3. Let L = (O,L). If CFσ,X ,O satisfies Requirements Ci and Cd and (L  B) ∩ X = ∅
then CFσ,X ,O(L) = LB.
Proof. If (LB)∩X = ∅, then preLB(X ) = ∅. From Ci we get LB ⊆ CFσ,X ,O(L), and from Cd we
get CFσ,X ,O(L) \ (LB) ⊆ ∅, hence CFσ,X ,O(L) ⊆ (LB).
The following property follows directly from the observation that by Proposition 1, the behavioral
models, traces, and specifications on which both counterfactual sets are computed are identical.
Proposition 4 (Stability of CF under trace equivalence). If Tr(B) = Tr(B′), Tr(L) = Tr(L′), and
∀i ∈ [n] : Tr(Si) = Tr(S′i) under the asynchronous interpretation, then CFσ,X ,O(L) = CFσ′,X ,O(L′) where
σ = (S, B) and σ′ = (S′, B′).
Finally we introduce a last requirement that is not part of the requirements for well-formed counterfac-
tual builders, but that is used to avoid well-formed but degenerate counterfactual builders by ensuring





(L B) \ X
)
can be shown to be well-formed, but it does not contain any configurations that
are not already present in the filtered log. The exhaustiveness requirement ensures counterfactuals are
not limited to this simple case. A counterfactual builder is exhaustive if the counterfactuals it builds
include all configurations not in the exclusion set, provided they meet three conditions: (1) they are
greater than the observed predecessors of the faulty configurations in the expanded log, (2) they are con-
sistent with, and invariant with respect to, the set R (the simple counterfactual builder above) defined as
the largest predecessor-closed subset of the expanded log from which X has been removed, and (3) they
are, together with R, predecessor-closed in the behavioral model. Intuitively, counterfactual executions
expand on the non-faulty prefixes of faulty configurations that appear in the log, provided their faulty
or non-faulty status be the same as in these prefixes. Note that components that have violated their
specifications in R may still do so in CFσ,X ,O(L). Formally:
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∅ {a1} {a1, c1} {a1, c1, a2}
{a1, c1, a2, f} {a1, c1, a2, f, e}
{g1} {a1, g1} {a1, c1, g1} {a1, c1, a2, g1}
{a1, c1, a2, f, g1} {a1, c1, a2, f, g1, e}
. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
{a1, c1, a2, c2} . . .
{a1, c1, a2, c2, g1} . . .
. . .
Figure 5: On the filtered log of the running example, requirement Exh ensures the configurations
{a1, c1, a2, c2}, {a1, c1, a2, c2, g1}, etc (printed in blue) are present in the counterfactual configuration
structures for the exclusion set X = f ∨ h. The meaning of the green and red colors is as in Figure 4.
Requirement 7 (Exhaustiveness Exh). A counterfactual builder CFσ,X ,O is exhaustive if it satisfies the
property Exh below, for any log L = (O,L), system specification σ = (S, B), B = (B,B), and exclusion
set X :




≤ C′ ∧©B(R ∪ C′) ∧ invS(R, C′) ∧ pcB(C
′ ∪R)
=⇒ C′ ⊆ CFσ,X ,O(L)
where: R ∆= lpcLB((LB) \ X )
Example 7 (Exh on the running example). Figure 5 illustrates the purpose of requirement Exh on the
running example for the exclusion set X = f ∨ h.
4.2 Causality Analysis
We now proceed to define a causality analysis based on counterfactual builders. For a given CFX we define
the notions of necessary and sufficient causality. Intuitively, a necessary cause is some configuration set
that must be present whenever a property violation is detected. A sufficient cause is some configuration
set that inevitably leads to the violation of a property. In this section, we consider only well-formed
counterfactual builders. We consider first the notion of necessary causality.
Definition 21 (Necessary causality). Let (S, B) be a system with component specifications S = 〈S1, ..., Sn〉
and Si = (Ei, Ci), P be a hyperproperty, L = {(O,Lj) | j ∈ J} be a log system in which a violation of
P is detected, and X ⊆ B be an exclusion set. X is a necessary cause of the violation of P in L if
CFX ({Lj | j ∈ J}) |= P.
The faults of a subset I of components are a necessary cause of the violation of P in L if X ∆= {c ∈
B | ∃i ∈ I : c↓Ei /∈ Ci} is a necessary cause of the violation of P in L.
That is, the configurations in X are a necessary cause for the violation of P in L if, in the counter-
factual scenarios where configurations in X do not occur, P would have been satisfied.
Remark 14. X is not required to be minimal in order to qualify as a cause. This is useful to reason
about group causality, for instance, to determine the liability of component providers that are responsible
for more than one component. In this example one could take X as the set of faulty configurations of all
components of a system that have been developed by the same provider.
Remark 15. To apply the definition of necessary causality to a property P and single log L = (O,L),
one needs only apply it to the lift hyperproperty [P]. By definition, we have that X is a necessary cause
of the violation of [P] in L = {L} if CFX (L) ∈ [P] ⇐⇒ CFX (L) ⊆ P ⇐⇒ CFX (L) |= P.
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We now prove that this notion of necessary causality is sound, in the sense that any necessary cause
contains some configuration appearing in the log or log system. We first prove it for properties, and then
for hyperproperties.
Proposition 5 (Soundness of necessary causality for properties). If X is a necessary cause for the
violation of property P in the log L = (O,L), and the counterfactual builder satisfies Requirements Ci
and Cd, then (LB) ∩ X 6= ∅.
Proof. By contradiction. Let X be such that (L  B) ∩ X = ∅. Because property P is violated in log
L, we have L 6|= P↓O. By Proposition 3 we have CFX (L) = L B. Hence CFX (L) 6|= P, and X is not a
cause for the violation of P in L.
Proposition 6 (Soundness of necessary causality for hyperproperties). If X is a necessary cause for
the violation of property P in the log system L = {Lj = (O,Lj) | j ∈ J}, and the counterfactual builder
satisfies Requirements Ci and Cd, then for some j ∈ J , (Lj B) ∩ X 6= ∅.




∈ P. Hence there exists a property




= P. Thus we have, for all j ∈ J , CFX (Lj) ⊂ P. By definition
of violation in a log system, we have
⋃
j∈J Lj 6∈ P↓O. Hence there must exist some k ∈ J such that
Lk 6⊆ P↓O, which means that P is violated in Lk. Since CFX (Lk) ⊂ P, this means X is a necessary cause
of the violation of P in Lk. Hence by Proposition 5, we have (Lk B) ∩ X 6= ∅.
Remark 16. Our definition of necessary causality applies to arbitrary hyperproperties, and the above
result on the soundness of necessary causality holds for arbitrary hyperproperties. However, as we will
see below, other results such as monotonicity with respect to observability and completeness of necessary
causality hold a priori only for subset-closed hyperproperties.
Proposition 7. Verifying necessary causality of configuration set X with respect to a property P and a
log L = (O,L) amounts to verifying a safety property on the counterfactual configuration set CFX (L).
Proof. The test of Definition 21 amounts to verifying whether CFX (L) ⊆ P. Any configuration c ∈
CFX (L) \ P is a finite witness for the violation of P by CFX (L); any violation of P by CFX (L) has such
a finite witness. The claim follows.
Proposition 8 (Necessary causality is monotonic wrt. observability for subset-closed hyperproperties).
For any behavioral model (B,B), log set L = {(O,Lj) | j ∈ J} with ∀j ∈ J : pcB↓O(L), O
′ ⊆ O, and
X ⊆ L  B with X ↑B↓O′ = X , and counterfactual builder CFX that satisfies Requirement Obs, if X is a
necessary cause for the violation of subset-closed hyperproperty P in L′ = {(O′,Lj↓O′) | j ∈ J} then it is
a necessary cause for the violation of P in L.
Proof. Let L = {Lj | j ∈ J} and L′ = {Lj↓O′ | j ∈ J}. Note first that if a violation of P is detected
in L′ (
⋃
L′ 6|= P↓O′), then it is also detected in L since O′ ⊆ O. Since X is a necessary cause for
the violation of P in L′, then CFX (L′) |= P. But then because CFX verifies Obs we have, for all
j ∈ J , CFX (Lj) ⊆ CFX (Lj↓O′). Hence CFX (L) =
⋃




↓O′) = CFX (L
′), and thus
CFX (L) |= P for P is subset-closed.
We now turn to the definition of sufficient causality. Intuitively, sufficient causality ought to be a kind
of dual of necessary causality. Unfortunately, we do not have a formal dual for the notion of necessary
causality. Instead, we settle for a notion of sufficient causality appropriate for properties only.
Definition 22 (Inevitable). The violation of a property P in a configuration structure C is inevitable if
∀tr ∈ maxTr(C) : CS(tr) 6|= P
Definition 23 (Sufficient cause). Consider a system (S, B) with S = 〈S1, ..., Sn〉 and Si = (Ei, Ci), a
property P, a log L = (O,L) in which a violation of P is detected, and Y ⊆ B. Y is a sufficient cause
for the violation of P in L if a violation of P in CFB\Y(L) is inevitable.
The faults of a subset I of components are a sufficient cause for the violation of P in L, if Y ∆= {c ∈
B | ∀i ∈ [n] \ I : c↓Ei ∈ Ci} is a sufficient cause for the violation of P in L.
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That is, the faults of components in I are a sufficient cause for the violation of P if for the coun-
terfactual scenarios where faults of components other than I do not occur, a violation of P is still
inevitable.
The following results show that our causality analysis does not blame any set of innocent components,
and that it finds a necessary and a sufficient cause for every system-level failure.
Proposition 9 (Completeness of sufficient causality). If the counterfactual builder satisfies Requirements
Ci and Cd then each inevitable violation of P in LB has a sufficient cause.
Proof. Suppose that LB is inevitably faulty with respect to P, and let I = {i ∈ [n] | (LB)↓Ei 6⊆ Ci}.
We have Y = B and X = B \ Y = ∅. Because CFX satisfies Requirements Ci and Cd, it follows with
Proposition 3 that CFX (L) = LB. Since LB is inevitably faulty with respect to P, X is a sufficient
cause for the violation of P in L.
Proposition 10. Let P be a property that is violated in log L = (O,L). If the faults of a subset I
of components are a necessary (resp. sufficient) cause for the violation of P in L, then the faults of
components [n] \ I are not a sufficient (resp. necessary) cause for the violation of P in L.
Proof. If X = {c ∈ B | ∃i ∈ I : c↓Ei /∈ Ci} is a necessary cause then CFX (L) |= P, thus CFX (L) is not
inevitably faulty, thus the faults of components [n] \ I are not a sufficient cause (since Y = B \X = {c ∈
B | ∀i ∈ I : c↓Ei ∈ Ci}).
Conversely, if the faults of the components in I are a sufficient cause then CFX (L), with X = {c ∈
B | ∃i ∈ [n] \ I : c↓Ei /∈ Ci}, is inevitably faulty with respect to P, hence CFX (L) 6|= P, and the faults of
components [n] \ I are not a necessary cause.
4.3 Fault Ascription
In this section we apply the causality analysis for properties defined in the previous section to the problem
of fault ascription. As in the previous section, we consider only well-formed counterfactual builders. Also,
we consider the case of system specifications that are consistent with respect to the given (hyper)property,
which amounts to say that when all the components behave according to their specification, the system
does not fail. Formally:
Definition 24 (Consistent system specification). A consistently specified system is a tuple (σ,P) where
σ = (S, B) is a system specification with S = ((Ei, Ci))i∈[n], and P is a hyperproperty such that
‖i∈[n] Ci ∩ B |= P.
With a consistent specification, hyperproperty P may be violated only if at least one of the com-
ponents violates its specification. Our definition of necessary causality is complete with consistently
specified systems, in the following sense, provided P is subset-closed.
Proposition 11 (Completeness of necessary causality for subset-closed hyperproperties). In a con-
sistently specified system, if CFX satisfies Requirement Snd then each violation of P in log system
L = {(O,Lj) | j ∈ J} has a necessary cause in B \ ‖i∈[n]Ci.
Proof. Let X = B \ ‖i∈[n]Ci, Dj = CFX (Lj), and D =
⋃
j∈J Dj . Because CFX verifies Snd, we have for
all j ∈ J Dj ⊆ B\X = B∩‖i∈[n]Ci. Hence we have D ⊆ B∩‖i∈[n]Ci that is, D contains only observations
consistent with executions where all components behave correctly. By consistent specification, because
P is subset-closed, we have CFX (L) |= P, thus X is a necessary cause for the violation of P in L.
In the case of a property P, any sufficient cause contains some configuration of the log where at least
one component has violated its specification:
Proposition 12 (Soundness of sufficient causality). If the faults of components I are a sufficient cause
for the violation of P in the log L = (O,L), and CFX verifies Requirements Snd and Cinv, then
(LB)↓Ei 6⊆ Ci for some i ∈ I.
Proof. Let I be such that ∀i ∈ I, (L  B)↓Ei ⊆ Ci. In order to check for sufficient causality of the
faults of the components in I we compute Y = {c ∈ B | ∀i ∈ [n] \ I : c↓Ei ∈ Ci} and X = B \ Y =
{c ∈ B | ∃i ∈ [n] \ I : c↓Ei /∈ Ci}. Let C = CFX (L). Because CFX verifies Snd and Cinv we have
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Figure 6: Anti-monotony of the counterfactual builder under refinement of the behavioral model.
C ⊆ B \ X ∧ ∀i ∈ [n] :
(
(L  B)↓Ei ⊆ Ci ⇒ CFX (L)↓Ei ⊆ Ci
)
, hence C ⊆ B ∩ ‖iCi. By consistency of
the specification it follows that CFX (L) is not inevitably faulty with respect to P, hence the faults of
components in I are not a sufficient cause for the violation of P.
4.4 Refinement
In Section 4.1 we considered intrinsic requirements on counterfactual builders. We now consider different
properties relating causality analysis and refinement. The idea is that counterfactuals built from a
refinement of a given behavioral model B are finer than the counterfactuals built from B, as illustrated
in Figure 6.
The following property characterizes monotony of CF under refinement of B, for the case where com-
ponent specifications are always satisfied and X is included in the refined behavioral model. Proposition 1
ensures that causality analysis composes with abstractions that ensure trace inclusion.
Requirement 8 (Refinement by model inclusion). Given system specifications σ = (S, B) and σ′ =
(S, B′) with B′ ⊆ B, and a log (O,L) in which a violation of a property P is detected. Then CFσ′,X ,O(L) ⊆
CFσ,X ,O(L), and necessary causality of the violation of P is invariant under refinement.
Definition 25 (Alphabet inclusion ). C ′ = (E′,D) refines C = (E, C) by alphabet inclusion, noted
C ′  C, if C = C ′↓E.
Requirement 9 (Refinement by alphabet inclusion). Given system specifications σ = (S, B) and σ′ =
(S′, B′) with S′ = ((E′i, C′i))i∈I and S = ((Ei, Ci))i∈I
∆
= S′↓B (where projection is applied component-wise),
B′ = (B′,B′)  B = (B,B), a log L′ = (O′,L′) with O′ ⊆ B′, exclusion sets X ⊆ B and X ′ ⊆ B′ such that
B \ X = (B′ \ X ′)↓B, and a property P such that a violation of P is detected by L = (O,L)
∆
= L′↓B, then
CFσ′,X ′,O′(L′)↓B ⊆ CFσ,X ,O(L)
If in addition CFσ,X ,O(L) |= P then CFσ′,X ′,O′(L′) |= P↑B
′ ∩ B′, that is, necessary causality is invariant
under refinement.
Notice that there is a qualitative difference between the requirement Obs and the above property on
refinement by alphabet inclusion: while the former varies the observable events but keeps the behavioral
model constant, the latter allows us to reason about refinement of the behavioral model, in the case of
full observability.
5 An Instantiation
In this section we propose a concrete definition CF ∗σ,X ,O of a counterfactual builder that we call WfE
counterfactuals (for Wf and Exh). This instantiation constructs from a log L a counterfactual configu-
ration structure where the exclusion set X to be checked for causality and its effects are eliminated and
replaced with alternative behaviors.
5.1 WfE Counterfactuals
We now develop a concrete and constructive definition of a counterfactual builder CFσ,X ,O.
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Definition 26 (CF ∗σ,X ,O). For a system specification σ = (S, B) with B = (B,B), a log L = (O,L) with
O ⊆ B, and a set X ⊆ B, let C = LB, R = lpcC(C \ X ), and
Pc = max
{








{c′ ∈ Zc \ X | inv+S (L, {c
′})}
)






As for CF we omit the subscripts σ and O in CF ∗σ,X ,O when there is no ambiguity.
In Definition 26, C is the set of configurations that are consistent with the log. An ascending chain
of configurations from ∅ to a configuration c ∈ C can be seen as an explanation of how c may have been
reached in L. Intuitively, configurations of C \X that cannot be explained in C represent effects of X that
would not have occurred in the absence of X . The role of lpcC in the definition of R is to remove those
configurations from C \X . The construction of Pc, for a faulty configuration c ∈ C ∩X , restricts c to the
observations of the maximal non-faulty sub-configurations that are consistent, for each component, with
the projection of the behavioral model, provided they are smaller than some element of R. Intuitively,
the definition of Pc implements “back-tracking” to the maximal configurations smaller than c that are
still explainable without X . For each “pruned” configuration c′ ∈ Pc, Zc′ is the set of extensions that
are consistent with the preserved part R↓O of the log. Finally, Gc is the maximal prefix-closed subset
of Zc that satisfies correctness with respect to X and invariance of the component specifications, that
is, no new component faults are introduced. The counterfactual configuration structure CF ∗σ,X ,O(L) is
obtained as the union of the preserved configurations R from the filtered log and the counterfactual
configurations in Gc. Notice that, while all configurations in CF ∗σ,X ,O(L) are consistent with the portion
R of the expanded log, they may not be consistent among each other, that is, they may represent traces
of alternative, non-confluent executions.
5.2 Properties
We first state a lemma that establishes a condition for monotony of the maximal prefix-closed subset of
configuration structures. This lemma will allow us to reason about the behavior of CF ∗ under varying
observability, logs, and refinement.
Lemma 1. Let C1, C2, and C3 be sets of configurations. If C1 ⊆ C2, (C2 \ C1) ∩ C4 > lpcC1(C1 \ C3), and
C4 ⊆ C3 then lpcC1(C1 \ C3) ⊆ lpcC2(C2 \ C4).
Proof. Let c ∈ lpcC1(C1 \ C3), hence c ∈ C2. If c ∈ min C2 the claim follows with C4 ⊆ C3. Otherwise
let M = max{c′ ∈ C2 | c′ ( c}. By c ∈ lpcC1(C1 \ C3) it follows that ∃c
′ ∈ M such that either
c′ ∈ lpcC1(C1 \ C3), or c
′ ∈ C2 \ C1 such that ∃c′′ ∈ lpcC1(C1 \ C3) : c
′′ ⊆ c′. By hypothesis we have that
(C2 \ C1)∩C4 > {c}, hence (C2 \ C1)∩C4 > M . It follows that c′ ∈ lpcC1(C1 \ C3)∪
(
C2 \ (C1 ∪C4)
)
. With
C1 ⊆ C2 and C4 ⊆ C3 it follows that c′ ∈ C2 \ C4. We recursively apply the same reasoning to construct
a descending chain from c in C2. It follows that there exists a descending chain from c to min C2 in C2
that remains in C2 \ C4, that is, c ∈ lpcC2(C2 \ C4).
Lemma 2. Given logs L = (O,L) and L′ = (O,L′), if L v L′ then LB v L′ B.
Proof. L  B ⊆ L′  B follows with the property ©BL′ of L′ from L v L′. Let c ∈ L  B and c′ ∈
(L′B)\(LB), hence c′↓O ∈ L′\L. By L v L′ it follows that ¬(c′ ⊆ c). Therefore, LB v L′B.





(L↓O′ B) \ X
)
↓O′ .
Proof. “⊆” follows from the Definition of filtering and monotony of set difference and projection. “⊇”:
suppose that c ∈ (L↓O′  B) \ X . Thus, c ∈ B \ X and c↓O′ ∈ L↓O′ . As L is a log we have that ©BL.
Therefore there is some ĉ ∈ L  B such that ĉ↓O′ = c↓O′ . From c /∈ X it follows with X ↑B↓O′ = X that
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Theorem 1. CF ∗ is well-formed.
Proof. Let σ = (S, B) with B = (B,B) and L = (O,L). We have to show the following properties:
• Snd: by Definition 26, all elements of CF ∗σ,X ,O(L) are either in R or in some Gc, any of which is a
subset of B \ X . Hence, CF ∗σ,X ,O(L) ⊆ B \ X .
• Ci: we have by Definition 16 {c ∈ C | ∀c′ ∈ C ∩X : ¬(c′ ⊆ c)} ⊆ lpcC(C \X ) where C = LB and
by Definition 26, lpcC(C \ X ) ⊆ CF
∗
σ,X ,O(L).








p∈Pc{c ∈ B |





p∈Pc{c ∈ B | p ⊆ c} ⊆
{
c ∈ B | ∃c′ ∈ preLB(X ) : c′ ⊆ c
}
. The claim follows.
• Cinv: in Definition 26, (L  B)↓Ei ⊆ Ci implies that the projections of R and all Gc are in Ci.
Hence, ∀i ∈ [n] :
(
(LB)↓Ei ⊆ Ci =⇒ CF
∗
σ,X ,O(L)↓Ei ⊆ Ci
)
.
• Obs: this proof is slightly more involved. If L = (O2,L) and O1 ⊆ O2 then with C1 = L↓O1  B
and C2 = L  B it follows that C2 ⊆ C1 and C2 \ X ⊆ C1 \ X . By X ⊆ C2 and Lemma 1 (with
(C1, C2, C3, C4) of Lemma 1 instantiated with (C2, C1,X ,X )), R2 ⊆ R1, where we use indices to
distinguish the intermediate results computed with O1 and O2 in Definition 26.
Next we show that Pc,2 ⊆ Pc,1. To this end we first show that between any two configurations
c1, c2 ∈ R2 such that ∀c ∈ R2 : c1 ⊆ c ⊆ c2 =⇒ c = c1 ∨ c = c2, there is no configuration c ∈ R1
“between” both, formally: ∀c ∈ R1 : c1 ⊆ c ⊆ c2 =⇒ c = c1∨c = c2. Suppose on the contrary that
for some c1 and c2 such a c ∈ R1 strictly between c1 and c2 exists. As c /∈ R2 it follows that either
(a) c /∈ C2 or (b) c /∈ lpcC2(C2 \ X ) due to a configuration c
′ ∈ X with c1 ( c′ ⊆ c. (a) is excluded
since by hypothesis pcB↓O2 (L), such that either c↓O2 = (c1)↓O2 or c↓O2 = (c2)↓O2 . In both cases it
follows that c ∈ C2, which contradicts the assumption of (a). (b) is excluded by X ↑O2↓O1 = X and
c1 ∈ R2. It follows that for any c ∈ C2 ∩ X and c′ ∈ Pc,2 satisfying the condition of set Pc,2 for
some r ∈ R2 in Definition 26, c′ ∈ Pc,1 using the same r, hence Pc,2 ⊆ Pc,1.






(R2)↓O2 . It follows, by the
definition of consistency, that Zc,2 ⊆ Zc,1. By Lemma 1 with C̄1 =
{





c′ ∈ Zc,1 | inv+S (C1, {c′}
}
, and C̄3 = C̄4 = X (where C̄1 ⊆ C̄2 follows from Zc,2 ⊆ Zc1 and
C2 ⊆ C1) we have that Gc,2 ⊆ Gc,1 and thus CF ∗σ,X ,O2(L) ⊆ CF
∗
σ,X ,O1(L↓O1).
• Inc: suppose that L v L′, L  B ⊆ L′  B, and invS(L  B,L′  B). Let C, R, Pc, Zc, and Gc
be defined as in Definition 26, and let C′, R′, P ′c, Z ′c and G′c denote the analog sets defined on L′
instead of L. Using Lemma 2 we obtain C v C′. By Lemma 1 with (C1, C2, C3, C4) = (C, C′,X ,X )
and using C v C′ it follows that lpcC(C \ X ) ⊆ lpcC′(C′ \ X ), hence R ⊆ R′. With C v C′ it





c′ and d ∈ Z ′c, c ⊆ d and ©B({d}, R′↓O), hence ©B({d}, R↓O) (by R ⊆ R′), and
Z ′c ⊆ Zc. Since Zc \ Z ′c consists of configurations that are consistent with R↓O but inconsistent
with R′↓O, no configuration of the difference is contained in any configuration of Z
′
c, hence Z ′c v Zc.
Furthermore, by Lemma 1 where C1 =
{




c′ ∈ Zc | inv+S (C, {c′}
}
, and
C3 = C4 = X , using Z ′c v Zc, and invS(C, C′), we obtain G′c ⊆ Gc. It follows that CF
∗
σ,X ,O(L′) \
(L′ B) ⊆ CF ∗σ,X ,O(L) \ (LB).
Theorem 2 (Exh). CF ∗ satisfies Requirement 7.
Proof. Let σ = (S, B) with B = (B,B) and L = (O,L). Let X and C′ ⊆ B\X be such that preC(C∩X ) ≤
C′, ©B(R ∪ C′), invS(R, C′), and pcB(R∪ C′), where C = LB and R = lpcC(C \ X ). Let d ∈ C′. From
preC(C ∩ X ) ≤ C′ it follows that there is some ĉ ∈ C ∩ X and c0 ∈ preC\X (C ∩ X ) such that c0 ⊆ d and
c0 ⊆ ĉ. Hence Pĉ 6= ∅. Take some c ∈ Pĉ. With©B(R∪C′) it follows that d ∈ Zc. By hypothesis we have
pcB(R∪ C′), therefore there is a prefix-closed chain C′′ in B from ∅ to d that is contained in R∪ C′, such
that C′′ ∪ {c} is again a chain (c may not be an element of C′′ since by definition, Pĉ is not necessarily
included in B). Again by hypothesis we have that invS(R, C′), hence inv+S (L, C′). With C′′ ∩ X = ∅ it
follows that C′′ ∩ Zc ⊆ lpcZc
(
{c′ ∈ Zc \ X | inv+S (L, {c′})}
)
. Therefore d ∈ Gc, and d ∈ CF ∗σ,X ,O(L).
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Theorem 3 (Refinement by model inclusion). CF ∗ satisfies Requirement 8 provided that (B\B′)∩X > B′
and {c ∈ B | ∃c′ ∈ LB : c ⊆ c′} = {c ∈ B′ | ∃c′ ∈ LB′ : c ⊆ c′}.
Proof. Let σ = (S, B) and σ′ = (S, B′) such that (1) B′ ⊆ B, (B \B′) ∩ X > B′, and (2) {c ∈ B | ∃c′ ∈
C : c ⊆ c′} = {c ∈ B′ | ∃c′ ∈ C′ : c ⊆ c′}, where C = L  B and C′ = L  B′. In Definition 26 we have
by (2) R = R′ and Pc = P ′c, where primed variables denote the results obtained by operating on B′.
Furthermore, Z ′c ⊆ Zc ∩B′ by (1) and R = R′. By Lemma 1 with (C1, C2, C3, C4) = (Z ′c, Zc,X ,X ), using
Z ′c ⊆ Zc ∩ B′ and (2), it follows that G′c ⊆ Gc, and using Pc = P ′c, CF
∗
σ′,X ,O(L) ⊆ CF
∗
σ,X ,O(L). With
L 6|= P↓O it follows that every necessary cause in B is also a necessary cause in B′.
Theorem 4 (Refinement by alphabet inclusion). CF ∗ satisfies Requirement 9 provided that ∀c′ ∈ B′ :(
(∃c ∈ L′ B′ : c′ ⊆ c) =⇒ (c′↓B ∈ X ⇐⇒ c′ ∈ X ′)
)
and ∀c′ ∈ L′ B′ ∀i : (c′↓B ∈ Ci ⇐⇒ c′ ∈ C′i).
Proof. Let σ = (S, B) and σ′ = (S, B′) such that B′  B and (1) S = S′↓B, (2) B \ X = (B′ \ X ′)↓B,
(3) ∀c′ ∈ B′ :
(
(∃c ∈ L′  B′ : c′ ⊆ c) =⇒ (c′↓B ∈ X ⇐⇒ c′ ∈ X ′)
)
, and (4) ∀c′ ∈ L′  B′ ∀i :
(c′↓B ∈ Ci ⇐⇒ c′ ∈ C′i). Let C = LB, C′ = L′ B′, and primed variables denote the results obtained
by operating on B′. By (3) we have C′↓B ⊆ C. By (2) and (3) we have C \ X = (C′ \ X ′)↓B. Thus
R′↓B = R. Furthermore, Pc = (P
′
c)↓B, and (Z ′c)↓B ⊆ Zc due to the stronger consistency constraint on the
elements of Z ′c. With X ⊆ B and (1), (2), (4) it follows that lpcZ′c
({





c′ ∈ Zc \X | inv+S (C, {c′})
})
. Hence, CF ∗σ′,X ′,O(L′)↓B ⊆ CF
∗
σ,X ,O(L), and if CF
∗
σ,X ,O(L) |= P then
CF ∗σ′,X ′,O(L′) |= P↑B
′ ∩ B′.
Remark 17 (Comparison with the definitions of [13, 15]). Formalizations of counterfactual analyses
for concurrent systems have been proposed in previous work [13, 15]. None of them is satisfactory: [13]
assumes all events to be observable, whereas [15] does not guarantee well-formedness nor monotony under
refinement.
We can show that CF ∗ is not comparable with the counterfactual function of Definition 9 of [13] and
the definition of CF in [15]. Intuitively, property Exh entails a form of exhaustiveness of CF ∗ whereas
an (informally stated) objective of the definitions in [13, 15] was closeness of the counterfactual behaviors
to the observed behavior.
Vice versa, the counterfactuals of Definition 9 of [13] are not included in CF ∗. This is because
CF ∗ preserves more information about the observed behavior than [13]. Consider for instance the set
L  B =
{
c1 ∪ c2 | c1 ∈ {∅, {p1}, {p1, v1}
}
∧ c2 ∈ {∅, {p2}, {p2, v2}
}
=: C modeling a situation where





. According to Definition 26 the set of preserved configurations is R = C \ X , that is,
all non-faulty configurations are preserved. In contrast, in [13] the “unaffected prefix” is conservatively
computed as the empty trace, as the formalism used there is not able to represent alternative correct
prefixes. Extending R is then subject to stricter consistency constraints than extending the empty prefix.
Comparing CF ∗ with [15], CF ∗ is not a superset of the definition of [15] in general, due to the
requirement that the configurations in Zc (Definition 26) are consistent with all preserved configurations
of the expanded log in R↓O, for which there is no counterpart in [15].
5.3 Comparison with Halpern and Pearl’s Actual Causality
While a formal comparison is beyond the scope of this paper, we will informally discuss how our approach
relates to [19] where actual causality is defined on a recursive structural equations model (SEM). Intu-
itively, a SEM M = (S,F) with S = (U ,V,R) consists of a set of variables partitioned into exogenous
variables U modeling inputs from the environment and endogenous variables V, with the values of each
variable X ∈ V being defined, on the domain RX , by function FX depending on a subset of U ∪ V. For
recursive SEM this dependency relation is acyclic.
A direct comparison between [19] and our work is made difficult by the following fundamental differ-
ence: recursive SEM are deterministic, and each intervention defines a unique counterfactual scenario.
In contrast, our approach supports non-determinism. In particular, faulty behavior is not fixed to the
observed one: when a faulty component is not fixed by intervention, then by Exh its counterfactual
faulty behavior may differ from the observed one unless the variables on which it depends keep their
actual values. Another, less fundamental difference lies in the fact that there is no notion of specifications
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— hence, of faults — in actual causality, even though extensions of actual causality with a notion of
normality have been proposed [18].
In order to compare both frameworks we will therefore proceed as follows. Consider a recursive SEM
M = (S,F) with S = (U ,V,R). We translateM into a system model σ(M) in our framework. We define
the behavioral model to consist of the set of all predecessor-closed partial valuations of U ∪ V that are
consistent with F . Furthermore, we define the universal component specifications SX =
{
∅, {X 7→ FX}
}
,
that is, the set of partial valuations of X consistent with FX . For a given valuation ~u of U and predicate
P over U ∪ V satisfied in M for ~u, written (M,~u) |= P, we can now determine the actual causes of
(M,~u) |= P. On the other hand let E(~u) =
{
{X 7→ x∗} | X ∈ V
}
, where x∗ is the observed value of
X. We use CF ∗ to determine the necessary causes among the exclusion sets X ⊆
{
{e} | e ∈ E(~u)
}
for
P in σ(M) such that whenever {X 7→ x∗} ∈ X then the valuations of all variables in V that transitively
depend on X, are also in X . We conjecture that (1) the results of Pearl’s “do” operator and of CF ∗
coincide, and (2) for any minimal necessary cause X of P in σ(M),
∧
{Xi 7→·}∈X Xi = x
∗
i is an actual
cause of P in M . A formal treatment of this comparison is left for future work.
5.4 Examples
Example 8 (Causal over-determination). Consider two components with specifications (Ei, Ci) where
Ei = {ei, fi} and Ci = {∅}, i = 1, 2, the behavioral model B = (E,B) with E = E1 ∪ E2, B =
B1‖B2, and Bi =
{
∅, {ei}, {ei, fi}
}
, the property P = ¬(f1 ∨ f2), and the log L = (E,L) with L ={
∅, {e1}, {e2}, {e1, f1, e2}
}
. For X = e1 we have LB = L,
















∅, {e2}, {e2, f2}
}
and CF ∗{e2}(L) =
{
∅, {e1}, {e1, f1}
}
. Both configuration structures still violate P, hence none of {e1} and
{e2} is a necessary cause for the violation of P. Conversely, both counterfactual configuration structures
are inevitably faulty with respect to P hence the faults of both components are sufficient causes for the
violation of P. Intuitively, even if one of the components had behaved correctly, P would still have
been violated. Notice that the occurrence of f2 in CF ∗{e1}(L) is a consequence of Exh: once the second
component has violated its specification we have no reason to assume that f2 will not happen.





, i = 1, 2, the behavioral model B = 2E with E = E1 ∪ E2, the property P = ¬(f1 ∧ f2),
and the log L = (E,L) with L =
{
∅, {f1}, {f1, f2}
}
, hence LB = L. In order to check whether X1 = f1
is a necessary cause for the violation of P we compute




∅, {e1}, {e2}, {f2}, {e1, e2}, {e1, f2}, {e2, f2}, {e1, e2, f2}
}





is inevitably faulty with respect to P, the fault of a single component alone is not a sufficient cause for
the violation of P.
Example 10 (Use of lpc in Definition 26). Consider two components with specifications (Ei, Ci) where
E1 = {f1, a}, E2 = {f2}, and C1 = C2 = {∅}, with observable events O = {f1, a, f2}, the behavioral model
B =
{
∅, {f1}, {f1, a}, {f2}, {f1, f2}, {f1, a, f2}
}
, the property P = ¬(f1 ∧ a), and the log L = (E1 ∪E2,L)
with L =
{
∅, {f1}, {f1, f2}, {f1, a, f2}
}
: both components produce a fault event fi; the conjunction of f1
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and a violates P. Let X = f1 ∧ ¬a. We have C = LB = L and
R = P{f1} = P{f1,f2} = {∅}
Z∅ = B
CF ∗X (L) = G∅ = lpcZ∅(Z∅ \ X ) = lpcZ∅
({






Hence CF ∗X (L) |= P, and X is a necessary cause. The configurations {f1, a} and {f1, a, f2} have no
explanation in R, in the sense that they are not reachable in the transition graph (B, 7→B) by any path
passing only through the configurations in R, and are removed by lpcC. Without applying lpcC, CF
∗
X (L)
would in addition contain {f1, a} and {f1, a, f2} and therefore still violate P, such that X would not be
recognized as a necessary cause.
Example 11 (Unobservable fault events). Consider the component specifications (Ei, Ci) with E1 =
{f1, e1}, E2 = {f2}, E3 = {f3, e3}, and Ci = {∅}, i = 1, ..., 3, with observable events O = {e1, f2, e3}, the
behavioral model B = (e1 =⇒ f1) ∧ (e3 =⇒ f3), the property P = ¬(e1 ∨ f2), the log L = (O,L) with
L =
{
∅, {e1}, {e1, e3}
}
, and X = f1. Intuitively, the first and third component produce an unobservable
violation of their specification; event e1 following f1 violates P, whereas the second component behaves
correctly. We have
C = LB =
{




CF ∗X (L) = G∅ =
{
∅, {f3}, {f3, e3}
}
|= P
thus X is correctly recognized as a necessary cause.
Example 12 (Running example). Let us get back to our running example and formally analyze the
responsibility of component C2’s failure for the violation of P = ¬e in
L =
{
∅, {a1}, {a1, c1}, {a1, c1, a2}, {a1, c1, a2, f}, {a1, c1, a2, f, e}
}
With X = f ∨ h we obtain (just giving the form of Zc and Gc in the basic case):
C = LB =
{
c ∪ c′ | c ∈ L ∧ c′ ∈
{




c ∪ c′ | c ∈
{













{a1, c1, a2} ∪ c′ | c′ ∈
{




{a1, c1, a2} ∪ c′ | c′ ∈
{




{a1, c1, a2} ∪ c′ | c′ ∈
{
{c2}, {g1}, {c2, g1}, {g1, g2}, ...
}}




Hence, X is a necessary cause for the violation of P in L.
Example 13 (Refinement by model inclusion). Let σ = (S, B) with component specifications Si = (Ei, Ci)
with E1 = {a, f1, f} and E2 = {b, f2, f}, C1 = {∅, {a}}, C2 = {∅, {b}}, the behavioral model B = (B,B)
with B = E1∪E2 and B =
{
∅, {a}, {f1}, {b}, {f2}, {a, b}, {f1, b}, {a, f2}, {f1, f2}, {f1, f2, f}
}
, the property
P = ¬(f1 ∧ f2), the log L = (O,L) with O = E1 ∪ E2 and L =
{
∅, {f1}, {f1, f2}
}
, and X = f1. We have
R = P{f1} = P{f1,f2} = {∅}
Z∅ = B
CF ∗σ,X ,O(L) = G∅ =
{
∅, {a}, {b}, {f2}, {a, b}, {a, f2}
}
With σ′ = (S, B′) where B′ = (E,B′) and B′ =
{
∅, {a}, {f1}, {b}, {f2}, {a, b}, {f1, f2}
}
(hence, B′ v
B) we obtain CF ∗σ′,X ,O(L) =
{
∅, {a}, {b}, {f2}, {a, b}
}
⊆ CF ∗σ,X ,O(L).
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Example 14 (Observational determinism). Consider an example of two processes P1 and P2 contending
for a shared resource. The processes are specified by the configuration structures (Ei, Ci) with Ei =
{reqi, wi, pi, vi} and Ci =
{
∅, {reqi}, {reqi, wi}, {reqi, pi}, {reqi, wi, pi}, {reqi, pi, vi}, {reqi, wi, pi, vi}
}
,
i ∈ [2] — that is, Pi may request the resource with reqi, wait (wi), take the resource (pi), and free
it again (vi). The behavioral model is B = (B,B) with B =
⋃
i∈[n] Ei and
B = {c1 ∪ c2 | c1 ∈ C1 ∧ c2 ∈ C2 ∧
∧
i=1,2
(wi ∈ ci =⇒ p3−i ∈ c3−i)},
meaning that process i may be waiting (wi) only if the other process has taken the resource before, the
log system L = {L1, L2} with Li = (O,Li) with O = E2 — that is, only the behavior of P2 is observable,
whereas that of P1 is meant to remain secret —, L1 =
{




∅, {req2}, {req2, p2}, {req2, p2, v2}
}
and the hyperproperty P = {P1,P2} with
P1 =
{
c1 ∪ c2 | c1 ∈ C1 ∧ c2 ∈
{
∅, {req2}, {req2, w2}, {req2, w2, p2}, {req2, w2, p2, v2}
}




c1 ∪ c2 | c1 ∈ C1 ∧ c2 ∈
{
∅, {req2}, {req2, p2}, {req2, p2, v2}
}
∧ c1 ∪ c2 ∈ B
}
requiring observational determinism (OD) [39, 7]. Intuitively, the observed behavior of P2 must be de-
terministic (either including or excluding w2 in the maximal trace), and not give away any information
about the state of P1. OD is a 2-safety hyperproperty, that is, it may be invalidated on a set of two traces
exhibiting different behaviors of P2. Clearly, L1∪L2 6|= P. Let us check that X = w2 is a necessary cause
for the violation of P. We have CF ∗X (L) =
{
∅, {p1}, {p1, v1}, {p1, v1, p2}, {p1, v1, p2, v2}
}
|= P, hence
X = w2 is a necessary cause for the violation of P.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have stated a set of formal requirements that should — all or in part, depending on
the intended application — be ensured by “well-formed” counterfactual builders in order to meaningfully
reason about causality. Intuitively, a counterfactual builder is a function CFσ,X ,O, parameterized by a
system specification, featuring a tuple of components, a set X of configurations to be checked for causality
and a set of observables, that takes as input a log L and returns a configuration structure modeling the
alternative executions, had the configurations in X not occurred in the execution observed in L. We have
discussed the properties of well-formed counterfactual builders, and considered the special case where
X represents a set of component faults, yielding a fault ascription analysis. In the second part of the
paper we have proposed a concrete well-formed counterfactual builder CF ∗, and we have shown it to be
monotonic under two notions of refinement. A well-understood behavior under refinement is crucial for
reasoning about causation in a complex system, via an abstraction of said system.
The importance of formal requirements for the design of counterfactual analyses was confirmed during
our writing of this article: previous versions of Definition 26 — that looked “reasonable” and met our
intuition on the catalog of examples — have been revisited several times after adding further expected
properties that turned out to be violated. The instantiated counterfactual function we have proposed is
not intended to be the last word, but rather the first step towards a set of counterfactual analyses whose
development will be triggered by formally stated requirements. For instance, for some applications
it would make sense to develop an instance of CF satisfying a variant of well-formedness where our
requirement Exh is replaced with minimal distance between the counterfactual and the actual executions,
reflecting Lewis’ “closest worlds” semantics [28].
The framework for causality analysis and fault ascription presented in this paper suffers from several
limitations, which need to be lifted in future work. First, our framework provides an analysis of neces-
sary causality in the case of hyperproperties, but most interesting results obtain only for subset-closed
hyperproperties. Obtaining similar results for non subset-closed hyperproperties is an item for further
study. Second, our notion of sufficient causality is limited to properties. Extending it to hyperprop-
erties is possible but only for weaker forms of inevitability. It remains to be seen how to extend it to
hyperproperties while retaining the current intuition of inevitability. Third, our framework currently
deals only with unlabelled configuration structures. One can argue that in practice one observes mostly
event labels. Also, usual notions of process equivalences such as similarities and bisimilarities are defined
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for labelled structures. Extending our framework to labelled configuration structures would allow us to
study the relations between causality analysis and non-trivial process equivalences.
More work is required to turn our framework into effective tools for causality analysis. As Definition 26
is constructive, it could be implemented as is for the finite case. In order to account for potentially
infinite behaviors and avoid the inefficiency of a naive implementation, our next steps will be to study
symbolic representations of counterfactual builders. In particular, we are interested in identifying models
of computation on which the counterfactuals can be computed efficiently. Additionally, more attention
needs to be paid to identify minimal causes, drawing in particular on results related to explanations and
counterexamples in model checking.
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A Glossary of Notations and Definitions
notation definition or meaning defined where
[n] {1, . . . , n} Section 2⋃
S
⋃
s∈S s Section 2
B, E, ... sets of events
C set of configurations (sets of events)
C configuration structure (CS) Definition 1
→C , 7→C step (resp. atomic step) transition relation Definition 2
‖, ∩, ⊆, max , ·↓·, ·↑·, ≤, > operations on CS Definition 3
P, P property, hyperproperty Definition 4
|= satisfaction Definition 5
Tr traces of a CS Definition 6
CS CS of a trace Definition 7
©BC consistency: ∃c ∈ B :
⋃
C ⊆ c Definition 12
LB filtering:
{
c ∈ L↑B ∩ B | ©B(L ∪ {c})
}
Definition 15
pcC′(C) pred. closed: ∀c ∈ C : c ∈ min C′ ∨max{c′ ∈ C′ | c′ ( c} ∩ C 6= ∅ Definition 16
lpcC′(C) largest pred.-closed subset of C w.r.t. C′ Definition 16
C ′ v C prefix inclusion: C ′ ⊆ C ∧ pcC(C′) Definition 17
preC(S) immediate predecessors:
⋃





C↓Ei ⊆ Ci =⇒ C′↓Ei ⊆ Ci
)
Definition 19
inv+S (L, C′) possible invariance: ∃C ⊆ B : C↓O = L ∧ invS(C, C′) Definition 19
Snd soundness of counterfactual builder Requirement 1
Ci independence correctness of counterfactual builder Requirement 2
Cd dependence correctness of counterfactual builder Requirement 3
Cinv correctness invariance of counterfactual builder Requirement 4
Obs observation anti-monotony of counterfactual builder Requirement 5
Inc incrementality of counterfactual builder Requirement 6
Exh exhaustiveness of counterfactual builder Requirement 7
C ′  C alphabet inclusion Definition 25
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